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China’s Sanctions and Rule of Law: How to
Respond When China Targets Lawyers
THOMAS D. GRANT* & F. SCOTT KIEFF**

The People’s Republic of China (PRC) has begun to use sanctions against
people who speak out against its policies.1 Well-known are the sanctions
that the PRC’s Foreign Ministry Spokesperson announced on January 20,
2021 against twenty-eight persons, both named and unnamed, who recently
served or were then serving in the Trump administration, including the
then-Secretary of State and National Security Adviser.2 On March 26, 2021,
however, the PRC announced sanctions against a less conspicuous target:
Essex Court Chambers, a set of barristers’ chambers in London known for
commercial work and investment arbitration.3 What ostensibly provoked
China’s unusual move was a hundred-odd-page legal opinion. Four
barristers in Essex Court—Alison Macdonald QC, Jackie McArthur, Naomi
Hart, and Lorraine Aboagye—had supplied the opinion to address whether
China might have international criminal responsibility for crimes against
humanity and genocide against the Uyghurs.4
If China adopted sanctions against a group of lawyers in private practice in
a mere fit of pique, then policy makers would have little reason to give the
* Thomas D. Grant is a Fellow of the Lauterpacht Centre for International Law at
Cambridge University. He is a former U.S. designee to the Permanent Court of Arbitration
and served as Senior Advisor for Strategic Planning in the U.S. Department of State’s Bureau of
International Security and Nonproliferation and in the Office of the Under Secretary for Arms
Control and International Security, 2019–2021.
** F. Scott Kieff is a professor at George Washington University Law School. A
commissioner of the U.S. International Trade Commission from 2013–2017, he has served as
an adviser to high-level government officers during the Bush, Obama, and Trump
Administrations on national security and economics.
1. Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Announces Sanctions on Pompeo and Others, MINISTRY OF
FOREIGN AFFS. OF CHINA (Jan. 20, 2021), https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/
s2510_665401/t1847554.shtml [https://perma.cc/3R8H-8YCC]
2. Id.
3. Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Announces Sanctions on Relevant UK Individuals and Entities,
MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFS. OF CHINA (Mar. 26, 2021), https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/
xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/2535_665405/t1864366.shtml [https://perma.cc/26UC-V73X]; see
also Essex Court Chambers Statement on Sanctions Imposed by Chinese Government, ESSEX CT.
CHAMBERS (Mar. 26, 2021), https://essexcourt.com/essex-court-chambers-statement-onsanctions-imposed-by-chinese-government/ [https://perma.cc/F3QY-UDXF].
4. See generally Alison Macdonald, et al., International Criminal Responsibility for Crimes Against
Humanity and Genocide Against the Uyghur Population in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region,
ESSEX CT. CHAMBERS, (Jan. 26, 2021), https://14ee1ae3-14ee-4012-91cfa6a3b7dc3d8b.usrfiles.com/ugd/14ee1a_3f31c56ca64a461592ffc2690c9bb737.pdf
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matter much thought.5 One would suppose that sanctions against highprofile public officials merit more concern.6 And, even sanctions such as
those are perhaps not too much cause for worry. We know that PRC
officials sometimes adopt a hectoring tone out of rhetorical habit rather than
strategic purpose.7 Why concern ourselves with China’s sanctions unless
they have a direct effect on trade, commerce, or other readily quantifiable
equities?
But China’s recent use of sanctions should not be ignored.8 Among
China’s sanctions last year, the sanctions against the Essex Court barristers
are particularly troubling.9 For reasons that policy makers need to
recognize, those sanctions were not mere rhetoric,10 and salving a bruised
ego was not China’s goal in adopting them. China has a method and a
purpose, and it connects to a larger strategy that China pursues on the global
stage. We need a clear view of how sanctions against private citizens
function: they produce immediate effects on the targets they name, but their
purpose is to produce lasting effects on the wider community to which the
targets belong.11 The community here particularly concerned is the legal
profession—and it would be a mistake to think China’s focus on that
profession is by chance. There are sound reasons to conclude it is by design.
The time has come to start thinking about how countries for which the rule
of law is not only a core value but also an indispensable tool might respond.
A recent case in the European Union (EU) related to U.S. sanctions
merits a closer look for the lessons it offers in crafting a response to China’s
sanctions strategy.12 Bank Melli Iran v. Telekom Deutschland,13 which the
Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) decided on December 21,
2021, illuminates some pitfalls for lawyers advising commercial actors as
they manage compliance in a complex environment of conflicting U.S. and
EU sanction regimes.14 The case should also interest policy makers because
it illustrates how one sovereign has used a so-called “sanctions blocking”
5. Id. The barristers wrote the opinion on instruction by the Global Legal Action Network,
the World Uyghur Congress, and the Uyghur Human Rights Project, human rights groups
concerned with the conduct of the PRC government toward the Uyghurs.
6. MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFS. OF CHINA, supra note 3.
7. MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFS. OF CHINA, supra note 1.
8. See id.
9. See MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFS. OF CHINA, supra note 1; see also MINISTRY OF FOREIGN
AFFS. OF CHINA, supra note 3.
10. See MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFS. OF CHINA, supra note 3.
11. See id.
12. Case C-124/20, Bank Melli Iran v. Telekom Deutschland GmbH, ECLI:EU:C:2021:386
(Dec. 21, 2021) [hereinafter Telekom (Judgment)].
13. Id. at ¶ 12.
14. As to the corporate compliance issues that Telekom Deutschland raises, see Thomas Grant
& Scott Kieff, Warnings And Guideposts From EU Sanctions Blocking Case, LAW360 (June 4, 2021,
5:43 PM) https://www.law360.com/articles/1390362/warnings-and-guideposts-from-eusanctions-blocking-case [https://perma.cc/W4KC-R2F3] (addressing CJEU Advocate General
Hogan’s opinion of May 12, 2021 in that case, hereinafter Telekom (Advocate General’s
Opinion).
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statute against sanctions that it wishes to counteract.15 The sanctions
concerned in the Telekom Deutschland case are U.S. sanctions against Iran;
they aim to impede Iran’s nuclear ambitions.16 The case should interest
policy makers, not because it will change anybody’s view for or against U.S.
Iran sanctions, but because it offers lessons for policy makers as they
strategize a way to counteract the serious effects that China’s sanctions will
have if left unanswered.

I. The Method and Purpose Behind China’s Sanctions
Before strategizing a response to China’s sanctions, policy makers need to
understand how China intends its sanctions to function—and what China
hopes they will achieve.
China, at first glance, in adopting the sanctions against Essex Court would
appear to have a narrow aim. The aim would appear to be to penalize a
small and specific handful of critics who have drawn attention to China’s
egregious record of abuse toward the Uyghurs.17 On inspection, the effect
of the sanctions even on the specific individuals they target would appear to
be slight.18 The four barristers who wrote the opinion about the Uyghurs
and the other barristers belonging to Essex Court will no longer be able to
travel to China; any assets they might hold in China will be frozen.19 It is
reported that these individuals, or most of them, in fact do not travel to
China very often and hold few if any assets there.20
To understand how China intends the sanctions to function, one must
widen the aperture and recognize that the people immediately targeted by
the Essex Court sanctions are only part of the story. It was Voltaire in his
novel Candide who described the death sentence of a British admiral as an act
“pour encourager les autres.”21 The admiral in question had displeased the
Admiralty, but the real point in sentencing him was to make an example in
front of the officer corps as a whole.22 A better understanding of the Essex
Court sanctions is much like that: China certainly was not pleased with the
four barristers who wrote the opinion and called China to account for its illtreatment of the Uyghurs,23 but it would be a mistake to think that that is
where the story ends. With the recent seemingly targeted sanctions, China
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. See MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFS. OF CHINA, supra note 3.
18. Id.
19. Alison Macdonald, et al., supra note 4, at 105; MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFS. OF CHINA,
supra note 3.
20. Primrose Riordan et al., UK Lawyers Feel Ripples of Chinese Sanctions on Essex Court
Chambers, FIN. TIMES (Apr. 4, 2021). https://www.ft.com/content/e6ab6819-6040-4b7f-b5793a51658f7a4b [https://perma.cc/G3P3-T4FV].
21. VOLTAIRE, CANDIDE OU L’OPTIMISME 174 (Librairie E. Droz 2d ed. 1931).
22. Id.
23. MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFS. OF CHINA, supra note 3.
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aimed to provide a demonstration to the legal profession as a whole.24 And
the demonstration has had visible effects.25
A number of barristers affiliated with Essex Court in Singapore quit the
chambers shortly after China adopted the sanctions.26 Toby Landau, a
Queen’s Council known for his work in international investment arbitration,
quit the chambers “with effect from . . . 2 April 2021.”27 Matthew Gearing
QC, a former co-head of arbitration at a major law firm who had planned to
move his practice to Essex Court, decided against it.28 Essex Court removed
the legal opinion from its website.29
So, China’s method is to make a demonstration—but for what purpose? A
reshuffling of nameplates around the Inns of Court in London has resulted
from the March 2021 sanctions.30 But this is only a surface reflection of a
deeper effect that China evidently seeks to bring about.31 We should
contemplate that, in fact, China seeks to spread a chill across the legal
profession, a subduing influence to stay or silence anybody in the profession
who might otherwise advance opinions that call China’s conduct into
question or advise or represent parties whom China dislikes.
The legal profession functions under rules resembling those of a guild, but
nobody today denies that it is also a business.32 And, as businesspeople,
lawyers seek to keep and increase their opportunities to do business. That
means keeping the clients they have and entering new engagements as new
clients come along.33 The converse is that lawyers are tempted to sidestep
those who might cost them business in the future. They seldom if ever do
this openly; in many rule-of-law jurisdictions, lawyers’ binding ethical duties
constrain them from such discrimination.34 Omissions and reticence are
hard to detect. However, for a sovereign of China’s influence in the world
24. Riordan et al., supra note 20.
25. See Jaime Hamilton, Essex Court Chambers Backpedals After China Imposes Sanctions, ROLL
ON FRIDAY (Apr. 1, 2021) https://www.rollonfriday.com/news-content/essex-court-chambersbackpedals-after-china-imposes-sanctions [https://perma.cc/HTD4-KXXZ]; see also Toby
Landau QC Leaves Essex Court Chambers, ESSEX CT. CHAMBERS (Apr. 6, 2021) https://
essexcourt.com/toby-landau-qc-leaves-essex-court-chambers/ [https://perma.cc/2D6E-A4JZ].
26. Jaime Hamilton, supra note 25.
27. ESSEX CT. CHAMBERS, supra note 25.
28. Gearing Changes Course after China sanctions, GLOBAL ARBITRATION REV. (Apr. 26, 2021),
https://globalarbitrationreview.com/sanctions/gearing-changes-course-after-china-sanctions
[https://perma.cc/TRS4-4MLJ].
29. Neil Rose, Chambers hit by China sanctions battens down the hatches, LEGAL FUTURES (Mar.
30, 2021), https://www.legalfutures.co.uk/latest-news/chambers-hit-by-china-sanctionsbattens-down-the-hatches [https://perma.cc/ET5S-V9K2].
30. Hamilton, supra note 25; ESSEX COURT CHAMBERS, supra note 25.
31. Hamilton, supra note 25; ESSEX COURT CHAMBERS, supra note 25.
32. Mark A. Cohen, Law Is a Profession and an Industry — It Should Be Regulated That Way,
FORBES (Mar. 29, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/markcohen1/2018/03/29/law-is-aprofession-and-an-industry-it-should-be-regulated-that-way/?sh=45bee33b6598 [https://
perma.cc/ME5V-LYMT].
33. Id.
34. THE BARS STANDARD BD. HANDBOOK r. C28 (Bar Standards Bd. 2020).
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economy, they are not hard to incentivize. With sanctions targeted in a
visible way on one group of lawyers, China has communicated a clear
incentive to the legal profession.35 The intended result—the legal profession
backing away from certain parties—is pernicious.36

II. The Global “Operating System” and China’s Revisionist
Aims
And, yet, evidence suggests that the purpose for which China is using
sanctions is more ambitious than depriving certain parties and causes of the
legal counsel they seek.37
Christopher Ford, a diplomat and national security official in the G.W.
Bush and Trump administrations, has argued for a decade that China seeks
not to gain mere tactical advantage, but instead to change the “operating
system” under which nations and societies function.38 The 2018 US
National Security Strategy stated the case like this: China’s goal is “to shape
a world consistent with [its] authoritarian model—gaining veto authority
over other nations’ economic, diplomatic, and security decisions.”39 To
shape the world that way means to transform both how countries relate to
one another and how they order their own affairs.40 China’s goal is not
minor adjustments here and there.41 It is wholesale revision.42
The conclusion that China aims to place itself at the apex of a new social
system on a worldwide scale is not based on guesswork.43 China’s leaders
have stated that is what China aims to do. Their invocation of the “Strong
Military Dream” and “the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation”
35. MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFS. OF CHINA, supra note 3.
36. Id.
37. Christopher A. Ford, U.S.-Australia “Track II” dialogue held at the Australian Defense
College in Canberra (Apr. 18, 2013), in Christopher A. Ford, The Asia-Pacific Region’s
“Operating System” and The “Chinese Dream” of Global “Return” NEW PARADIGMS F. (Apr. 30,
2013), https://www.newparadigmsforum.com/p1667 [https://perma.cc/84HY-PT4Z]; See also A
‘China Model?’ Beijing’s Promotion of Alternative Global Norms and Standards: Hearing Before the
U.S.-China Econ. & Sec. Rev. Comm’n, 116th Cong. 35–69, 169–80 (2020) (statements of Daniel
Tobin, Member of the China Studies Faculty, National Intelligence University, and Senior
Associate (Non-resident), Freeman Chair in China Studies, Center for Strategic and
International Studies) [hereinafter Beijing’s Promotion of Alternative Global Norms].
38. Ford, supra note 37; Beijing’s Promotion of Alternative Global Norms, supra note 37.
39. JIM MATIS, DEP’T OF DEF., SUMMARY OF THE 2018 NATIONAL DEFENSE STRATEGY OF
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: SHARPENING THE AMERICAN MILITARY’S COMPETITIVE
EDGE 2 (2018).
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Dr. Christopher Ashley Ford, Assistant Secretary Bureau of International Security and
Nonproliferation, Testimony to the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission
(June 20, 2019) in Technology and Power in China’s Geopolitical Ambitions, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE
(June 20, 2019), https://2017-2021.state.gov/technology-and-power-in-chinas-geopoliticalambitions/index.html [https://perma.cc/3R9Z-PWJJ].
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underpin the aspiration to return China to world preeminence, which China
held until expanding European empires overwhelmed it in the 19th century
and a long internal crisis ensued.44 In calling to make China once again the
most powerful state in the world, China’s leaders make clear that a change of
the socio-political system goes hand-in-hand with that goal.45 President Xi
in 2013 said that China “must . . . build[ ] a socialism that is superior to
capitalism, and lay[ ] the foundation for a future where we will win the
initiative and have the dominant position.”46 In his speech in 2017 to the
National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, President Xi predicted
that “the Marxism of 21st century China will, without a doubt, emanate
more mighty, more compelling power of truth.”47
Lest President Xi be misunderstood to mean that China will prevail on
the strength of compelling argument, China’s conduct evinces a strategy of
action.48 This includes China’s strategic lending to low-income countries,49
conducted without the democratic and human rights standards applicable to
World Bank loans;50 its Belt-and-Road Initiative that shunts not only trade
but dispute settlement procedures into PRC channels;51 its endeavor with
Russia to reshape the socio-legal systems of Eurasia along lines that eschew
the individualism and freedoms associated with the United States and other
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Xi Jinping, General Secretary, Uphold and Develop Socialism with Chinese
Characteristics (Jan. 5th, 2013), translated in Tanner Greer, Xi Jinping in Translation: China’s
Guiding Ideology, PALLADIUM (May 31, 2019), https://palladiummag.com/2019/05/31/xijinping-in-translation-chinas-guiding-ideology/ [https://perma.cc/8R8C-NYSX].
47. Xi Jinping, Secure a Decisive Victory in Building a Moderately Prosperous Society in All
Respects and Strive for the Great Success of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New
Era, Delivered at the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China (Oct. 18,
2017), in Full text of Xi Jinping’s report at 19th CPC National Congress, XINHUA (Nov. 3, 2017,
5:17 PM), http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/download/
Xi_Jinping’s_report_at_19th_CPC_National_Congress.pdf).
48. See Drew Thompson, The Rise of Xi Jinping and China’s New Era: Implications for the United
States and Taiwan, 56 ISSUES & STUD.: SOC. SCI. Q. ON CHINA, TAIWAN, & E. ASIAN AFF.
204004, 2040004-3 (2020).
49. See SOPHIE RICHARDSON, CHINA’S INFLUENCE ON THE GLOBAL HUMAN RIGHTS
SYSTEM 3 (2020), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/
FP_20200914_china_human_rights_richardson.pdf.
50. Jonathan Wheatley, China’s secret loan contracts reveal its hold over low-income nations, FIN.
TIMES (Mar. 31, 2021), https://www.ft.com/content/7e98795f-159b-4455-903e-6e21c345d4a9
[https://perma.cc/Z6VN-AXH4] (note that the World Bank supports human rights as a part of
its twin goals “to end extreme poverty and promote shared prosperity.” See Justice and
Development, WORLD BANK, https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/governance/brief/justicerights-and-public-safety [https://perma.cc/334D-XA7S].
51. Jiangyu Wang, Dispute Settlement in the Belt and Road Initiative: Progress, Issues, and Future
Research Agenda, 8 CHINESE J. COMPAR. L. 4, 11 (2020); Wangwei Lin et al., Developing a
Dispute Resolution Mechanism for China’s “One Belt, One Road” Initiative, 4 CO. LAW. 118, 118
(2019).
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rule-of-law countries.52 China’s macro-economic and security policies have
significantly affected international economic relations:53 Free trade—which
countries have pursued since World War II through the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and its development into the World Trade
Organization (WTO)54—relies on the premise that economic relations are
essentially firm-to-firm and, thus, governed by the free market.55 China
erodes the premise with far-reaching mercantilist and security policies,
including its so-called military-civil fusion (MCF).56 China, in pursuing its
system-changing ambitions, also uses blunt intimidation.57 For example,
PRC dam-building projects at home and abroad take control of water flow
from downstream neighbors—a leveraging tactic that countries widely
understand to be illegal.58 China asserts claims that would exclude all other
nations from the South China Sea, a vast maritime area where international
law and the practice of centuries’ standing denies any one country exclusive
rights.59
52. Cf. Press Release, People’s Republic of China and the Russian Federation, Joint statement
of the People’s Republic of China and the Russian Federation on the development of a
comprehensive strategic partnership for collaboration in the new era (Jun. 6, 2019), https://
www.bilaterals.org/?joint-statement-of-the-people-s [https://perma.cc/9M8E-MW7K]. See
also, ANDREW SCOBELL ET AL., CHINA’S GRAND STRATEGY: TRENDS, TRAJECTORIES, AND
LONG-TERM COMPETITION 9 (2020) (leaders in China perceive that they are in a long-term
geopolitical competition with the United States), https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/
RR2798.html [https://perma.cc/9XEX-KLLZ].
53. See John J. Mearsheimer, Bound to Fail: The Raise and Fall of the Liberal International Order,
43 INT’L SEC. 7, 46 (2019).
54. See, e.g., CRAIG VANGRASSTEK, THE HISTORY AND FUTURE OF THE WORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATION (2013), https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/historywto_e.pdf.
55. See Winston H. Griffith, Neoliberal Economics and Caribbean Economies, 44 J. ECON. ISSUES
505, 505 (2010).
56. See U.S. DEP’T STATE, MILITARY-CIVIL FUSION AND THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA
(2020), https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/What-is-MCF-One-Pager.pdf. See
also, William Barr, Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t Just., Remarks on China Policy at the Gerald R. Ford
Presidential Museum (July 17, 2020), https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/transcript-attorneygeneral-barr-s-remarks-china-policy-gerald-r-ford-presidential-museum [https://perma.cc/
M229-NUF7].
57. See SEC’Y STATE, THE ELEMENTS OF THE CHINA CHALLENGE 17-18 (2020), https://
www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/20-02832-Elements-of-China-Challenge-508.pdf.
58. See Patrick Mendis & Antonina Luszczykiewicz, The Geopolitics of Water and the New IndoPacific Strategy, HARV. INT’L REV. (Mar. 22, 2021), https://hir.harvard.edu/geopolitics-oftaiwan-and-tibet/ [https://perma.cc/V7KB-UK27]. See, e.g., Mirza Zulfiqur Rahman, Geopolitics
of Sino-Indian Transboundary Water Management in the Yarlung Tsangpo and the Brahmaputra, 45
MONDES EN DÉVELOPPEMENT 63, 64 (2017).
59. The exorbitance of China’s claims is not in China’s claims to certain existing natural land
features (rocks). It is in China’s assertion that it holds some form of sovereign right over
maritime areas that neither law nor modern practice recognize as susceptible to appropriation or
unilateral jurisdiction. China is deliberately imprecise—and changeable—when alluding to that
sovereign right, but it has used physical intimidation against other countries’ fishing vessels and
oil and gas platforms in the area concerned. The main symbolic expression of China’s
exorbitant South China Sea claim is the so-called nine-dashed line, communicated in 2009.
U.N. Secretary-General, Letter dated May 7, 2009 from the Permanent Mission of the People’s
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Geopolitics, though out of fashion in most humanities and social sciences
faculties,60 has shaped the conduct of countries for centuries and continues
to do so today.61 Strategists in the US have recognized the centrality of
geopolitical thought to China’s leaders,62 as those leaders seek to change the
international system not merely to give China new advantages but to place
China in a position of unrivaled power.63 It is in this sense that China is a
revisionist state, not one satisfied with the status quo.64
The metaphor of China seeking to replace the “operating system” of
world affairs is particularly salient when considering China’s use of sanctions
against the legal profession.65 If any institution in a rule-of-law society
belongs to its “operating system,” then it is the law.66 The courts, party
counsel, and adjudication are not mere accessories in the United States and
like-minded countries.67 They are core elements of how we, in these
Republic of China addressed to H.E. Mr. Ban Ki-Moon, Sec’y Gen., CML/17/2009, https://
www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/mysvnm33_09/chn_2009re_mys_vnm_e.pdf;
U.N. Secretary-General, Letter dated May 7, 2009 from the Permanent Mission of the People’s
Republic of China addressed to H.E. Mr. Ban Ki-Moon, Sec’y Gen., CML/18/2009, https://
www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/vnm37_09/chn_2009re_vnm.pdf. See also, In
the Matter of the South China Sea Arbitration (Phil. v. China), Case No. 2013-19, ¶¶ 169-278
(Perm. Ct. Arb. 2016). Regarding the unlawfulness of China’s claims to “some form of
exclusive jurisdiction” in the South China Sea, see United States Department of State, People’s
Republic of China: Maritime Claims in the South China Sea 150 LIMITS IN THE SEAS 1, 14-15, 1719, 21, 24-25, 30 (2022).
60. But see UNIV. CAMBRIDGE CENTRE FOR GEOPOLITICS, ANNUAL REPORT 2020 4 (2020),
https://www.cfg.polis.cam.ac.uk/system/files/documents/
centre_for_geopolitics_annual_report_2020.pdf.
61. See Graham Allison, The New Spheres of Influence: Sharing the Globe with Other Great Powers,
99 FOREIGN AFF. 30, 30-31, 36, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2020-0210/new-spheres-influence.
62. See Robert D. Blackwill & Ashley J. Tellis, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, REVISING
U.S. GRAND STRATEGY TOWARD CHINA 36-37 (2015), https://carnegieendowment.org/files/
Tellis_Blackwill.pdf.
63. See Hal Brands & Jake Sullivan, China Has Two Paths to Global Domination, FOREIGN POL’Y
(May 22, 2021), https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/05/22/china-superpower-two-paths-globaldomination-cold-war/# [https://perma.cc/WH42-AE4L].
64. See DEP’T OF DEF., SUMMARY OF THE 2018 NATIONAL DEFENSE STRATEGY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf [https://perma.cc/BT92-UQG6]; see also Christopher
Ford, Ideological “Grievance States” and Nonproliferation: China, Russia, and Iran, NEW
PARADIGMS F. (Nov. 12, 2019), https://www.newparadigmsforum.com/p2442 [https://
perma.cc/UG7D-N32J ].
65. See Chenglin Liu, Risks Faced by Foreign Lawyers in China, 35 ARIZ. J. OF INT’L & COMPAR.
L. 131, 135 (2018); William Nee, China’s 709 Crackdown Is Still Going On, THE DIPLOMAT (July
9, 2021), https://thediplomat.com/2021/07/chinas-709-crackdown-is-still-going-on/ [https://
perma.cc/3CSA-HRZY].
66. See Raul Cordenillo & Kristen Sample, Introduction, in RULE OF LAW AND
CONSTITUTION BUILDING: THE ROLE OF REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 1-2 (Cordenillo &
Sample eds.2014),.
67. See RACHEL KLIENFIELD BELTON, COMPETING DEFINITIONS OF THE RULE OF LAW:
IMPLICATIONS FOR PRACTITIONERS 8-9, 11 (2005).
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countries, understand who we are. But they are not just about values or
identity: the rules, procedures, and institutions of our legal system are crucial
tools, and we rely on them in all aspects of society, including in the
operation of government and public administration.68 China’s sanctions in
March 2021, while targeting a small group of lawyers in one country, should
be seen as part of a larger strategy to influence legal systems.69 Legal
systems—as China’s strategic vision seems to hold them—are tolerable if
they acquiesce in China’s conduct, but if they challenge China then China
seeks to bring them to heel.70 China has discovered sanctions as a tool to
pursue that goal.71
Problematically, the professional practices and habits of mind that make
lawyers and judges so important in a rule-of-law society72 do not necessarily
attune them to the kind of risk involved here.73 Law is about the
particulars—particular parties, particular disputes, and particular rules.74 It
is not the lawyer’s job to strategize about geopolitics.75 Accordingly, lawyers
and judges are not likely to respond to the threat that intrusive and coercive
measures such as the Essex Courts sanctions present, except by modifying
their behavior case by case.76 That is what China likely anticipated.77 It is
precisely what lawyers did.78 Following the sanctions—in some instances
68. Fritz Morstein Marx, The Lawyer’s role in Public Administration, 55 YALE L. J. 498, 498
(1946).
69. See Emily Feng, China’s New Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law Sends a Chill Through the Business
Community, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (June 11, 2021), https://www.npr.org/2021/06/11/1005467033/
chinas-new-anti-foreign-sanctions-law-sends-a-chill-through-the-business-communi [https://
perma.cc/T2KS-NTYC]; Austin Ramzy, China Moves to Punish Lawyers Hired to Help Hong Kong
Activists, N.Y. TIMES (Jan 4, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/04/world/asia/chinahong-kong-lu-siwei-ren-quanniu.html [https://perma.cc/8ABD-YKST].
70. See INT’L SERV. FOR HUM. RTS., Human Rights Defenders and Lawyers in China: A MidTerm Assessment of Implementation During the UPR Second Cycle 6-8 (2015), https://
www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/UPR/NGOsMidTermReports/
ISHR_midterm_China.pdf [https://perma.cc/EKN4-DDJJ].
71. See Emily Feng, ‘Where No One Dares Speak Up’ China Disbars Lawyers on Sensitive Cases,
NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Feb. 18, 2021), https://www.npr.org/2021/02/18/963217332/where-noone-dares-speak-up-china-disbars-lawyers-on-sensitive-cases [https://perma.cc/YBD4-XEMX].
72. See Robert W. Gordon, The Role of Lawyers in Producing the Rule of Law: Some Critical
Reflections, 11 THEORETICAL INQ. L. 441, 457-58 (2010).
73. See BEN. W. HEINEMAN, JR. ET AL., LAWYERS AS PROFESSIONALS AND AS CITIZENS: KEY
ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES IN THE 21ST CENTURY 6, 10, 22, 51 (2015).
74. See Jamal Green, Rule of Originalism, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 1639, 1653, 1776 (2016).
75. See Miro Cerar, The Relationship Between Law and Politics, 15 ANN. SURV. INT’L &
COMPAR. L. 19, 21-22 (2009).
76. See Riordan et al., supra note 20.
77. See Judith McMorrow et al., Lawyer Discipline in an Authoritarian Regime: Empirical Insights
from Zhejian Province, China, 30 THE GEO. J. OF L. ETHICS 267, 288, 291, 297 (2017).
78. See Alun John and Scott Murdoch, China’s Planned Anti-Sanctions Law for Hong Kong
Unsettles Financial Sector, REUTERS (Apr. 19, 2021), https://www.reuters.com/business/finance/
chinas-planned-anti-sanctions-law-hong-kong-unsettles-financial-sector-2021-08-19/ [https://
perma.cc/WB6S-Y5LC].
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almost immediately—lawyers modified their behavior.79 They distanced
themselves from the colleagues and the organization that China had
targeted.80 In so doing, they amplified the warning that China had
intended.81 The warning is this: if you express views to which China objects,
or represent clients of whom China disapproves, then you should expect
China to impose costs.82 The result that China hopes thereby to achieve is
to silence any who might object to China’s conduct83—and, in time, to
reconfigure the “operating system” of the rule-of-law world.84 That result is
not the business of the legal profession alone.85

III. Tit-for-Tat? Or Meaningful Impact?
Naturally, when a competing country adopts a measure that one judges to
prejudice one’s own country’s interests, the first reaction is to address the
competing country with a reciprocal measure, similar in target and
amplitude.86 Tit-for-tat is typical in diplomatic incidents87: one country
expels an embassy officer, then the other country expels an officer of similar
rank.88 In diplomatic incidents, states take measures at government-togovernment level.89 Each measure targets the government itself.90 We
79. See China Undermining Human Rights By Locking Up Rights Lawyers, UN Independent Expert
Says, U.N. NEWS (Dec. 16, 2020), https://news.un.org/en/story/2020/12/1080242 [https://
perma.cc/S555-P925].
80. See Meganne Tillay, Essex Court Loses Another QC After Chinese Sanctions, LAW.COM INT’L
(Aug. 18, 2021), https://www.law.com/international-edition/2021/08/18/essex-court-losesanother-qc-after-chinese-sanctions/ [https://perma.cc/U2PD-FRTD].
81. See Lisa Shuchman, Global Talent Wars and Geopolitics Upend the Legal Industry, LAW.COM
INT’L (Oct. 18, 2021), https://www.law.com/international-edition/2021/10/18/global-talentwars-and-geopolitics-upend-the-legal-industry/ [https://perma.cc/H7LN-HVCD].
82. See U.S. Dep’t of State, Bureau of Democracy, H.R. and Lab, China 2020 Human Rights
Report 1-2, 11-12 (2020).
83. See Malcolm Jorgenson, China Is Overturning the Rules-Based Order from Within, THE
INTERPRETER (Aug. 12, 2020), https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/chinaoverturning-rules-based-order-within [https://perma.cc/BZ2M-WLMG].
84. See JEFFREY CIMMINO, A STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK FOR COUNTERING CHINA’S HUMANRIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN XINJIANG 5-7 (2021).
85. See Barbara Dluhosch & Daniel Horgos, (When) Does Tit-for-Tat Diplomacy in Trade Policy
Pay Off? 2 (FIW- Rsch. Ctr. Int’l Econ. Working Paper, Paper No. 84, 2012),
86. See MARIANNE SCHNEIDER-PETSIGNER ET AL., US-CHINA STRATEGIC: THE QUEST FOR
GLOBAL TECHNOLOGICAL LEADERSHIP 3-6 (2019).
87. See Olga Krasnyak, Tit for Tat: Diplomatic Expulsions and Closures, UNIV. OF S. CAL. CTR.
FOR PUB. DIPLOMACY (Sept. 13, 2017), https://uscpublicdiplomacy.org/blog/tit-tat-diplomaticexpulsions-and-closures [https://perma.cc/JH79-XXQZ].
88. See Andrew Osborn & Tom Balmforth, Russia Retaliating Against Washington, Asks 10 U.S.
Diplomats to Leave, REUTERS (Apr. 12, 2021), https://www.reuters.com/business/finance/
kremlin-says-putin-decide-counter-sanctions-against-washington-2021-04-16/ [https://
perma.cc/3LFN-Q64A].
89. See id.
90. See Heather A. Conley & Roksana Gabidllina, The Costs of Weaponizing Russian and Western
Diplomatic Expulsions, CT. FOR STRATEGIC AND INT’L STUD. (June 10, 2021), https://
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should ask, however, whether it is adequate here to focus on China itself, in
response to the particular challenge that China’s anti-rule-of-law sanctions
have raised.91
Several high-profile individuals and institutions, as well as the U.S. and
UK governments, have ventured to address the Essex Court sanctions.92 It is
not clear that the measures taken so far will counteract the sanctions’
intended effect.93
The UK Prime Minister and U.S. President “expressed their concern
about retaliatory [action]” taken by China.”94 The UK Foreign Minister
addressed the matter, stating that “[i]t speaks volumes that, while the UK
joins the international community in sanctioning those responsible for
human rights abuses, the Chinese government sanctions its critics.”95
The regulatory bodies for barristers in the British Isles—the Bar Council
of England and Wales, the Faculty of Advocates of Scotland, and the Bar
Council of Northern Ireland, and the Bar of Ireland—adopted a joint
statement about the sanctions.96 The joint statement, inter alia, called on
“national and international Bar associations to condemn the imposition of
these sanctions as an unjustifiable interference with the professional role of
lawyers and an attack upon the rule of law internationally.”97 The joint
statement acknowledged that the sanctions “are . . . a threat to the global
legal community,” and called on the People’s Republic of China (PRC), to
“review these sanctions.”98
Senior executives of the International Bar Association (IBA) also made
statements. Mark Ellis, the IBA Executive Director, said that “[w]e respect
and applaud those who are holding to account anyone who may be violating
www.csis.org/analysis/costs-weaponizing-russian-and-western-diplomatic-expulsions [https://
perma.cc/2EKX-LV8T].
91. See SECURING A DEMOCRATIC WORLD: THE CASE FOR A DEMOCRATIC VALUES-BASED
U.S. FOREIGN POLICY (2018),
92. See Caroline Simson, Response to China’s Sanctions on UK Lawyers Seen as Weak, LAW 360
(May 3, 2021), https://www.law360.com/articles/1379363/response-to-china-s-sanctions-onuk-lawyers-seen-as-weak [https://perma.cc/EH4C-RVZ2].
93. See id.
94. See Johnson and Biden share UK-US concern about Chinese response to sanctions – spokesman,
REUTERS (Mar. 26, 2021), https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-britain-usa-johnson-biden/
johnson-and-biden-share-uk-us-concern-about-chinese-response-to-sanctions-spokesmanidUSKBN2BI2Y9 [https://perma.cc/3BGA-62FG].
95. Press Release, Dominic Raab, Secretary of State for Foreign, Commonwealth and
Development Affairs, China’s sanctions on UK citizens: Foreign Secretary’s statement, https://
www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-sanctions-perpetrators-of-gross-human-rights-violations-inxinjiang-alongside-eu-canada-and-us [https://perma.cc/5UMS-4SYT].
96. See Statement of the Four Bars on PRC Government Sanctions Against Barristers, https://
www.barcouncil.org.uk/resource/statement-of-the-four-bars-on-prc-government-sanctionsagainst-barristers.html [https://perma.cc/A23U-UYVE].
97. Id.
98. Id.
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the fundamental human rights of others.”99 The Executive Director’s
remarks are welcome insofar as they reflect his organization’s cognizance of
the possibility that somebody might be responsible for human rights
violations, even if the remarks were pointedly non-specific with respect to
who the violator might be.100 Sternford Moyo, the IBA President, said that
“[i]t is ironic that the very voices the Chinese authorities sought to silence
have, inadvertently, been amplified because of imposition of sanctions.”101
These remarks, too, are welcome, expressing solidarity as they do with the
lawyers whom China sanctioned.
It is far from clear, however, that amplifying the message was inadvertent.
It would appear to be of a piece with the method that China here employs.
China’s method in sanctioning the Essex Court lawyers is to induce changes
of behavior in the legal profession as a whole; China’s purpose is therefore
served when governments and legal institutions merely supply reminders
that China is ready to impose costs on lawyers who refrain from adopting
those changes.102 In the responses to date, it is easy to discern reminders—
an inadvertent amplification—of the very threat that China aims to
communicate. But it is hard to discern any reason for the profession to
refrain from doing precisely what Chin’s threats are designed to get them to
doa.
To have a meaningful impact, a response to China’s sanctions must give
the profession a reason to refrain from changing their behavior to comport
with China’s preferences: the response must include some practical incentive
for lawyers. The EU, with the sanctions blocking statute that it adopted in
1996 to forbid compliance by EU parties with certain foreign sanctions,
illustrates one way such a response might be shaped. The EU sanctions
blocking statute to date has addressed only US sanctions. The statute is
drafted, however, so that it could address other countries’ sanctions as well.
That statute may be read, moreover, not just for its specific legal machinery,
but for the outline of a general approach to counter-sanctions strategy.
To begin considering how a blocking statute might work, let us turn to the
recent case in which the EU’s blocking statute has been applied, Telekom
Deutschland, before suggesting some other steps that countries and the legal
profession might take along the lines of that general approach.

IV. Telekom Deutschland and Making Counter-Sanctions Work
In Telekom Deutschland, the E.C.J. was called upon to interpret Council
Regulation (EC) No. 2271/96 of November 22, 1996—a sanctions blocking
statute that aims to “counteract[ ] the effects of the extra-territorial
99. Press Release, Int’l Bar Ass’n, China: IBA Salutes Advocates Standing Up for the Rule of Law
(Mar. 29, 2021), https://www.ibanet.org/article/1E5D5333-F4C7-4CA7-9255C8D5F5CFB3D8 [https://perma.cc/5CGV-X8PT].
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. See e.g. Council Regulation 2271/96, art. 1, 1996 O.J. (L 309) 2 (EC).
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application” of certain U.S. sanctions laws.103 The circumstances were that
Telekom Deutschland, seemingly in response to the extraterritorial
application of U.S. sanctions addressing Iran, terminated certain service
contracts with Bank Melli Iran, an Iranian state-owned bank.104 The bank
sued to restore the service contracts.105
The Advocate General delivered his opinion in Telekom Deutschland
(Opinion) on May 12, 2021 and the Court (Grand Chamber) delivered its
judgment on December 21, 2021. In the essential points of the case, the
judgment accorded with the Judge Advocate’s opinion, though with some
important refinements that are salient to how a legislator might fashion a
sanctions-blocking law to address China’s anti-rule-of-law sanctions.
Under the judgment of December 21, 2021, Bank Melli Iran’s case is now
referred back to the national court which had stayed proceedings to request
the CJEU’s judgment.106 In accordance with the judgment the national
court shall apply the EU’s sanctions blocking statute, even though the U.S.
sanctions law, to date, was not accompanied by any U.S. judgment or other
action directly addressing Deutsche Telekom.107 According to the CJEU,
“the mere threat of the legal consequences that could be incurred” by
breaching the U.S. sanctions law are “capable of producing [the] effects” that
the EU sanctions-blocking statute is intended to prevent.108 An initial point,
then, is that a response to sanctions needs to address the dissuasive effects of
sanctions, not just specific legal burdens the sanctions have actually placed
on a sanctions target. This is an important point when we consider China’s
sanctions because, as noted, China intends its sanctions not merely to affect
particular targets; it intends them to dissuade important actors throughout
society from carrying out their proper functions. .
The judgment of December 21, 2021 affirms that the blocking statute
gives a private party such as Bank Melli Iran standing to sue.109 As the
Advocate General had observed, it is not just for public regulators to enforce
the counter-sanctions law.110
Two substantive points that the Advocate General had drawn attention to
are particularly relevant for present purposes. First, the Advocate General
had concluded that a person who has terminated a contractual obligation
with a sanctioned party may be compelled to give reasons why it did so.111
So too may a person who has refrained from entering a contractual relationship
103. Id. at 2.
104. Telekom (Judgment), supra note 12, ¶¶ 16-22; Telekom (Advocate General’s Opinion),
supra note 14.
105. Telekom (Judgment), supra note 12, ¶ 23; Telekom (Advocate General’s Opinion) supra note
14.
106. Telekom (Judgment), ¶ 34.
107. Telekom (Judgment), ¶¶ 42–51.
108. Telekom (Judgment), supra note 12, at ¶ 49.
109. Telekom (Judgment), supra note 12, at ¶¶ 59, 67–68.
110. Telekom (Advocate General’s Opinion), supra note 14.
111. Id.
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with a sanctioned party be called upon to give reasons why.112 On our
reading, the CJEU’s judgment accords with those conclusions.113
The second substantive point is that a person who has terminated a
contractual relationship in order to comply with the sanctions may be
compelled by a court to re-enter the relationship.114 The Advocate General
acknowledged that this injunction, which is akin to specific performance, is a
“blunt” remedy but concluded that the statutory language requires it.115
Here, the CJEU added some important nuance. The CJEU acknowledged
that a national court remedy of annulment—by which Deutsche Telekom’s
termination of its contracts with Bank Melli Iran would cease to have any
legal effect and, thus, those contracts, in effect, would be reinstated—would
“entail[. . .] a limitation on the freedom to conduct a business” which is a
fundamental right of companies and individuals in the EU116; and, moreover,
that reinstating its contracts with the Iranian company, because doing so
would run afoul the US sanctions law, would expose Deutsche Telekom to
the potential loss of its US business—in other words, nearly half of Deutsche
Telekom’s entire business.117 The CJEU identified two pathways to avoid
such a catastrophic impact on the defendant. One is contained in the EU
sanctions-blocking statute itself. Under the second paragraph of Article 5 of
the EU Regulation, a party may seek authorization to comply with a foreign
sanction. The task of deciding whether to grant such an authorization
belongs to the EU Commission, to be assisted by a committee of the EU
Parliament (the Committee on Extra-territorial Legislation).118
The other pathway available to a defendant is to plead to the national
court that non-compliance with the foreign sanctions (which is to say,
compliance with the EU sanctions-blocking Regulation) will cause an injury
to the defendant out of proportion to any benefit that state of affairs will
produce for the EU legal order.119 The sanctions-blocking Regulation
serves “to protect the established legal order and the interests of the
European Union in general,” but the implementation of the Regulation
must be in a manner that does not have disproportionate effect on the
defendant’s fundamental economic rights.120
112. Id.
113. The judgment interprets Art. 5 of the EU sanctions-blocking law, Regulation No. 2271/
96, not to require, in itself, that a party give reasons when terminating a contract with a person
on the US sanctions list. Telekom (Judgment), supra note 12, at ¶ 63. However, in a civil
proceeding in which the claimant alleges infringement of the Regulation, if the evidence “tends to indicate
prima facie” that the defendant has terminated the contract in order to comply with the US sanctions that
the Regulation intends to block, then the burden is on the defendant to prove that sanctions compliance
was not the reason for termination. Id., ¶ 67.
114. Telekom (Advocate General’s Opinion), supra note 14. For reasoning, see id.
115. Id., ¶ 136.
116. Telekom (Judgment), supra note 12, at ¶ 77.
117. Id., ¶ 16.
118. Id., ¶ 84.
119. Id., ¶¶ 90–95.
120. Id., ¶ 90.
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The two pathways for avoiding adverse economic consequences of
ignoring foreign sanctions seem to be intertwined, at least to a degree. In
Deutsche Telekom’s case, it appears that the company did not apply to the
EU Commission to obtain an authorization to comply with US Iran
sanctions.121 Though the matter will be in the hands of the national court,
the CJEU suggests that this omission will weaken any proportionality plea
that Deutsche Telekom might make in the national court proceedings.122 It
would appear that the CJEU is inviting—but does not require—the national
court to lay down an incentive on companies to channel future sanctions
compliance/non-compliance issues through the EU Commission procedure
supplied by the second paragraph of Article 5 of the sanctions-blocking
Regulation. The Advocate General thus was correct to say that the remedy
for failing to respect the sanctions-blocking Regulation can be “blunt,” but
the CJEU has drawn attention to a regulatory channel (through the
Commission with assistance of the parliamentary committee) and a
proportionality assessment (to be conducted by the national court) that
might soften the impact.
The posture of the legal profession in regard to China’s sanctions is not
identical to that of companies like Telekom Deutschland engaged in business
relationships with sanctioned entities. But the scope of the relevant
provision of the EU blocking statute is broad:
“No person referred to . . . shall comply, whether directly or through a
subsidiary or other intermediary person, actively or by deliberate
omission, with any requirement or prohibition, including requests of
foreign courts, based on or resulting, directly or indirectly, from the
laws specified in the Annex or from actions based thereon or resulting
therefrom.”123
The phrases “based on or resulting, directly or indirectly from” and “based
thereon or resulting therefrom” suggest the breadth of the provision’s scope.
The provision does not appear to be restricted to active steps that are in
direct response to a barred foreign sanctions law (that is, one of the “laws
specified in the Annex”).
A blocking statute drafted to address the particular challenge raised by
China’s sanctions could both broaden and refine the focus. For example, a
legislator might consider calling on professional services firms to
demonstrate that their reason for entering or refraining from selected
relationships is not to hew to China’s wishes. Under a blocking statute, a
firm that avoids potential clients whom China has targeted with sanctions
might trigger possible liability exposure. Individual practitioners might face
121. Id., ¶ 93.
122. Telekom (Judgment), supra note 12, at ¶ 93.
123. Council Regulation 2271/96, supra note 102, art. 5. The phrase “[n]o person referred to”
brings within Art. 5’s scope a number of categories of persons, including, among others, “any
natural person being a resident in the [EU],” and “any legal person incorporated within the
[EU].” Id. art. 11.
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discipline or liability for sanctions compliance or other defined behavior that
serves the sanctions’ purpose. So, too, could a sanctions-blocking statute
supply pathways such as those that the CJEU identified in the December 21,
2021 judgment, available to a party that demonstrates that complying with
the statute in the circumstances would impose on the party a burden out of
proportion to the public purpose that the legislator intends compliance to
serve.
There may be a role here for professional bodies as well as legislatures.
Considering how to fashion a response to the Essex Court sanctions, an
eminent English barrister, Lord Sandhurst QC, suggested that the Bar
Councils modify their codes of professional conduct.124 The object would be
to dissuade lawyers from taking clients who might flee the sanctioned set:
“Essex Court Chambers cannot be left isolated. It would be intolerable if
other chambers or law firms simply took over work which is transferred
away from Essex Court. Urgent thought must be given to special codes of
conduct to prevent that.”125 The Bar Councils (at least as of January 2022)
had not modified their codes in any considerable way.126
Private parties might also have a role to play. As noted in Telekom
Deutschland, the EU blocking Regulation entails standing for certain private
parties to bring suit, where they are ready to make plausible allegations that
a defendant’s conduct was for purposes of compliance with a barred
124. Neil Rose, Former Bar Chair’s Rallying Call: ‘We Are All Essex Court Now’, LEGAL FUTURES
(Apr. 6, 2021, 12:03 AM), https://www.legalfutures.co.uk/latest-news/former-bar-chairsrallying-call-we-are-all-essex-court-now.
125. Id.
126. Some lawyers well may object that such modification would take the codes of professional
conduct in altogether new and unfamiliar directions, but the existing codes, in fact, contain
provisions that would seem to impose obligations along somewhat similar lines. The present
writers are not members of the English bar, so we do not purport to give interpretations of
English bar rules. But the Bar Standards Board Handbook contains a number of exacting
provisions in relation to the duty of barristers to supply legal services. BAR STANDARDS BOARD,
BAR STANDARDS BOARD HANDBOOK – VERSION 4.6 (Dec. 31, 2020). Turning to Rule C28, for
example, one reads that, if you are a barrister, “[y]ou must not withhold your services or permit
your services to be withheld: 1. on the ground that the nature of the case is objectionable to you
or to any section of the public; 2. on the ground that the conduct, opinions or beliefs of the
prospective client are unacceptable to you or to any section of the public. . .” Id. § C28. The
interpretative Guidance to Rule C28 says that “[t]his obligation applies whether or not the
client is a member of any protected group” for purposes of UK statute. Id. Famously, English
barristers are subject to the “cab rank rule”—which likens their professional duty to represent
clients to the tradition among London cab drivers that a driver is obliged to take the first
passenger who requests a ride at the head of a line of cabs. Id. § C29. The bar rules express the
rule at Rules C29 and C30. See id. §§ C29, C30. Subject to exceptions relating, inter alia, to
fees and professional specialty and availability, a barrister is obliged to accept instructions from
a client, irrespective of the identity of the client and the nature of the case to which the
instructions relate. Id. § C29. No doubt, the lawyers who moved chambers after China’s
sanctions in March 2021 have taken care of these rules. But one might ask whether reorganizing one’s practice so as not to offend China is the best possible way to fulfill the
standards that the Bar places on the profession.
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sanctions law.127 The burden on a plaintiff in this regard is not very
onerous.128 If a claimant “simply provide[s] prima facie evidence” that the
defendant “may feel concerned by one of the pieces of [sanctions] legislation
mentioned in the annex [to the blocking statute]” and the claimant has
fulfilled the general commercial and legal conditions for becoming or
remaining the defendant’s customer,129 then the burden arguably shifts to
the defendant. The defendant must then “establish that there was an
objective reason, other than the fact that the [claimant] was subject to
primary sanctions” to explain why the defendant adopted the course of
conduct it did (i.e., terminating a relationship or declining to start one); and
the court must “verify the veracity of such [reason].”130 Readying their
internal records for litigation along these lines no doubt would place an
unwelcome compliance burden on potential future defendants. According to
the Advocate General, the burden, however, is one that the EU legislator
thought is justified by the policy purpose served.131
China, with its Essex Court sanctions, seeks to change how the legal
system functions by dissuading the legal profession at large from
representing clients, interests, or viewpoints that China opposes. To have a
meaningful impact, the response that governments and the profession adopt
to the sanctions must counteract that dissuasive method. A response to the
sanctions, therefore, should be considered that would give the profession
incentives that run the other way.
Sovereign-to-sovereign measures may also have a role to play as rule-oflaw societies address China’s sanctions, but measures that function only at
sovereign level do not quite hit the mark. In pursuit of its larger goals,
China’s method is to induce change in private behavior, and so a sanctions
counter-strategy needs to focus at the private level too.
The European Parliament, on May 20, 2021, gave an example of what a
sovereign-level response might look like.132 China had sanctioned certain
EU parliamentarians.133 The Parliament voted to freeze efforts to ratify the

127. Telekom (Judgment), supra note 12, ¶¶ 59, 67–68.
128. See id.
129. Telekom (Advocate General’s Opinion), supra note 14.
130. Id., ¶ 98 (emphasis in original); see also id., ¶ 111.
131. Id., ¶ 97. The CJEU in its judgment of Dec. 21, 2021, on our reading, does not take any
clear exception with the Advocate General on this point about compliance burden. Moreover,
where the judgment identifies the possibility of the burden of proof shifting to the defendant
(Telekom (Judgment), supra note 12, ¶ 68), it follows that a prudent business with a potential
exposure to US sanctions liability will take steps in its own decision-making and record-keeping
to prepare itself for the situation in which a plaintiff might demand proof of the reason for its
acts or omissions.
132. See generally Resolution on Chinese Countersanctions on EU Entities and MEPs and
MPS, EUR. PARL. DOC. P9_TA(2021)0255 (2021).
133. Id. ¶ D.
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Comprehensive Agreement on Investment, an EU-China trade treaty.134
According to the European Parliament’s resolution on the matter, it
“considers it crucial for the EU and all its institutions to stand united against
this attack against European democracy and in defending our common
values.”135 The resolution “demands that China lift the sanctions before
Parliament can deal” with the trade agreement.136 It also said that
“intimidation attempts [by China] are futile.”137 The resolution is
encouraging because it suggests that at least one important legislator
recognizes the gravity of the situation.138 Assuming that the resolution
results in a serious delay in the EU-China trade negotiations, it is not a mere
token.139
But the Parliament resolution is still very much in the traditional mold; it
is a sovereign-to-sovereign measure, addressed to a government to get that
government to do, or refrain from doing, something.140 To this extent,
suspending trade negotiations, while helpful, does not respond everywhere
that a response must be felt. China’s sanctions have already bypassed the
classic channel of intergovernmental relations.141 China does not intend the
sanctions to change the conduct of this or public authority regarding one or
another specific issue.142 China’s target is the behavior and habits of mind of
private institutions and individuals, who form a critical piece of the
operating system of a rule-of-law society.143 The Essex Court sanctions are a
tool to induce systemic change.144 To counteract them, rule-of-law societies
need to shape a response that reaches the same audience and influences that
audience to continue to play its proper role within the system to which it
belongs.

134. Jorge Liboreiro, MEPs Vote to Freeze Controversial EU-China Investment Deal, EURONEWS
(June 24, 2021), https://www.euronews.com/2021/05/20/european-parliament-votes-to-freezecontroversial-eu-china-investment-deal [https://perma.cc/K6RG-XAN4].
135. Resolution on Chinese Countersanctions on EU Entities and MEPs and MPs, supra note
132, ¶ 9.
136. Id. ¶ 10.
137. Id. ¶ 3.
138. See id. ¶ H.
139. See id. ¶ 6.
140. Id.
141. See Riordan et al., UK Lawyers Feel Ripples of Chinese Sanctions on Essex Court Chambers,
FINANCIAL TIMES (April 4, 2021), https://www.ft.com/content/e6ab6819-6040-4b7f-b5793a51658f7a4b [ https://perma.cc/7XQP-LL6W].
142. See id.; see also Christopher Ford, Ideological “Grievance States” and Nonproliferation: China,
Russia, and Iran, NEW PARADIGMS FORUM (Nov. 12, 2019), https://
www.newparadigmsforum.com/p2442 [https://perma.cc/C6JU-PC3W].
143. Essex Court Chambers Statement Sanctions Imposed by Chinese Government, ESSEX COURTS
CHAMBERS (Mar. 26, 2021), https://essexcourt.com/essex-court-chambers-statement-onsanctions-imposed-by-chinese-government/ [https://perma.cc/L97E-H2GQ].
144. See Riordan et al., supra note 141.
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V. The Equivalency Trap
Some might say that China’s sanctions are, in effect, equivalent to the
sanctions that the US has employed for many years; that China’s sanctions
are no more troubling than those sanctions; and, thus, it lies ill in the mouth
of policy makers in the United States, or its allies, to criticize China. In at
least two respects, however, China’s sanctions are very much unlike
sanctions employed by the United States.
First, the ongoing US-EU contest over sanctions and their secondary
effects does not, or at least should not, concern policy goals.145 It concerns,
instead, what tools are appropriate for a country to use in regard to an area
of policy where a great deal of common ground exists.146 Nuclear
nonproliferation and counterterrorism are not at odds with rule-of-law; to
the contrary, these are policies supported, at least in word, by practically all
countries.147 No such common ground exists between China and the
democratic countries in which China is targeting its sanctions. The
difference with China is over both the propriety of PRC sanctions that have
effects outside China and the policies and socio-political change that China
hopes the sanctions will promote.
Second, the conduct from which China’s sanctions aim to dissuade
individuals and institutions is of systemic importance to the societies in
which those sanctions have their intended dissuasive effects: China’s
sanctions threaten freedom of expression, freedom of association, and the
functioning of the legal profession in service to the rule of law.148 While the
EU judges it to be an infringement of its rights when US sanctions deter a
German telecommunications company from providing phone service to an
Iranian bank, we think a more serious concern is a sanction that coerces the
Bar into resiling from its duty to represent parties in litigation, to supply
candid legal advice, and to take principled stands in defense of human
rights.149 The Essex Court sanctions aim to cast a pall over the legal
profession, not merely to stop certain commercial actors from engaging in
specific transactions.150
We think that to suggest equivalency between the US and PRC sanctions
is to fall into a trap. Human beings tend to habituate to new realities. If
PRC sanctions, such as those against Essex Court, come to be accepted as a
new reality, then, no doubt, English barristers will habituate themselves to
145.
146.
147.
148.

Telekom (Advocate General’s Opinion), supra note 14.
Id.
See id. ¶ 2; see also Christopher Ford, supra note 142.
See ANDREW SCOBELL ET. AL., CHINA’S GRAND STRATEGY: TRENDS, TRAJECTORIES,
AND LONG-TERM COMPETITION, 9 (Rand Corp., 2020).
149. See Telekom (Advocate General’s Opinion) supra note 14; see also Riordan et al., supra note
141.
150. Neil Rose, Chambers Hit by China Sanctions Battens Down the Hatches, LEGAL FUTURES
(Mar. 30, 2021), https://www.legalfutures.co.uk/latest-news/chambers-hit-by-china-sanctionsbattens-down-the-hatches [https://perma.cc/FE5H-YVVT].
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it.151 We submit that quitting our professional affiliations and self-censoring
in response to threats from a one-party dictatorship that seeks a free hand to
suppress its ethnic minorities and impose its “operating system” on the
world at large is not a good habit. On the contrary: it is behavior that a ruleof-law society should act to prevent. Declaring PRC sanctions to be
equivalent to western sanctions is unconvincing on the merits, and, we fear,
it invites habituating to PRC sanctions.
The wider legal setting behind the EU blocking statute is relevant here.
The recitals to the EU blocking statute declare that the extraterritorial
application of “such laws, regulations and other legislative instruments” as
the US instruments targeted by the statute “violate international law.”152
The Advocate General observed that academics and parliamentarians in
some EU Member States have said that US sanctions, when the sanctions
have extraterritorial effects, are “not easily reconciled with general principles
of public international law,”153 a view that the CJEU, quoting the recitals of
the sanctions-blocking Regulation, reiterated.154 If US sanctions are not,
then China’s sanctions, serving to insulate China from scrutiny for evidently
gross violations of human rights, must be very difficult to reconcile with
those principles indeed. True, the objections that the Advocate General
mentioned are objections about extraterritoriality, irrespective of the policies
that the sanctioning government pursues.155 But if “general principles of
public international law” are brought into the picture, then it is unclear to us
why those principles should be limited to scrutinizing the sanction’s
methods: surely, the sanction’s purpose also should enter into how rule-oflaw countries respond.156

VI. Summing Up: The Geopolitical Challenge and Making
Counter-Sanctions Strategy Work
The democratic-liberal world has faced geopolitical challenges before, but
the challengers in the past, though using a wide range of tactics, seldom used
sanctions.157 Sanctions that exclude an individual or a firm from a market are
useless if nobody wants in that market. The USSR, the democratic-liberal
world’s chief competitor from 1945 to 1989, was not a market that very
many individuals or firms in the free world were eager to enter.158 The
USSR, therefore, did not attain strategic objectives by using sanctions
151. Riordan, et al., supra note 141.
152. Council Regulation 2271/96, supra note 102, at 1.
153. Telekom (Advocate General’s Opinion), supra note 14.
154. Telekom (Judgment), supra note 12, at ¶ 3; see also id.
155. See Telekom (Advocate General’s Opinion), supra note 14.
156. See id.
157. See Sanctions Are Now a Central Tool to Governments Economy, THE ECONOMIST (Apr. 22,
2021), https://www.economist.com/finance-and-economics/2021/04/22/sanctions-are-now-acentral-tool-of-governments-foreign-policy [https://perma.cc/E26F-Y2WP].
158. Polly Mosendz, Russian Sanctions Have Been Pointless, but the Next Ones Could Hurt the U.S.
More, THE ATLANTIC (Mar. 5, 2014), https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2014/
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against individuals or firms in the free world.159 By contrast, many around
the world are eager to participate in China’s market.160 A PRC sanctions law
that excludes a professional or commercial actor from China’s market,
therefore, has the potential to be an effective tool in China’s international
relations.161 China indeed now has begun to use sanctions.
The initial indications are that China has aimed its sanctions smartly. The
recent experience with China’s Essex Court sanctions suggests that the legal
profession will respond quickly to a sanctions threat.162 The Essex Court
sanctions were aimed at a small number of lawyers but carried an
unmistakable message to the legal profession at large: cross China, and face
consequences.163 The United States, United Kingdom, and like-minded
countries should be concerned if China targets any industry with sanctions,
but China’s targeting of the legal profession should occasion particular
concern.164 The legal services industry is not just another industry. In a
society based on rule of law, it is vital to every aspect of society.165 To change
the operating code of the legal profession the way that China seeks would be
to change society in fundamental ways.166 It is China’s concept of “legal
warfare,” which other writers have recently addressed,167 directed against law
itself.
The change that China seeks by targeting lawyers with sanctions is in
service to geopolitical objectives that China’s leaders openly articulate.168
Nation-states functioning on the basis of democratic-liberal principles are at
odds with the “harmonious society” that China says will come to pass when
China returns to its natural place as the central polity and political system of
03/russian-sanctions-have-been-pointless-but-the-next-ones-could-hurt-the-us-more/359502/
[https://perma.cc/9PMF-MRA3].
159. Id.
160. John Hung, Doing Business in China, 4 (2020), https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/
Deloitte/cn/Documents/international-business-support/deloitte-cn-csg-doing-business-inchina-2020-en-201102.pdf.
161. Riordan et al., supra note 141.
162. See id.
163. Id.
164. See id.
165. David Papke, Rule of Law in American Life: A Long and International Tradition, AMERICAN
BAR ASS’N (Aug. 29, 2019), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/public_education/resources/
rule-of-law/rule-of-law-in-american-life--a-long-and-intentional-tradition/ [https://perma.cc/
3VEN-GU4D].
166. See Munoz Mosquera & Sascha Dov-Dominik (Dov) Bachmann, How China Uses Strategic
Preconditioning in the Age of Great Power Competition, FLETCHER FORUM OF WORLD AFFAIRS
(last visited May 18, 2021), http://www.fletcherforum.org/home/2020/5/13/how-china-usesstrategic-preconditioning-in-the-age-of-great-power-competition [https://perma.cc/R2LDH6YK]; see also Christopher Ford, supra note 142.
167. Mosquera, supra note 166.
168. See Orazio Coco, Contemporary China and the Harmonious World Order in the Age of
Globalization, THE CHINESE J. OF CORP. GOVERNANCE, 1 (2020).
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the world.169 Accordingly, those principles—the operating system of ruleof-law societies—must give way to China’s conception of governance if
China is to achieve its aspiration in the stated way.170
The democratic-liberal countries, when facing geopolitical revisionist
states in the past, faced them essentially at the intergovernmental level.171
Interpenetration of societies and economies was minimal, and so,
geopolitical strategy was directed at influencing domestic constituencies only
to a degree. It is the systematic, large-scale targeting of key constituencies in
democratic-liberal societies that identifies China’s sanctions as a new
concern.172
In its strategy today, China might well say that its sanctions intrude upon
democratic-liberal countries nowhere near as much as Europe’s measures of
socio-political control did in China in the age of Europe’s rise.173 There
may be echoes here, if distant, of China’s experience in the 19th and early
20th centuries with the so-called capitulations—treaty arrangements under
which China’s courts and legal profession were subordinated to European
jurisdiction, so that disputes involving Europeans (and select Chinese
collaborators) were no longer subject to the laws and procedures of China
but, instead, removed to “mixed courts” set up by the European countries in
key Chinese cities.174 Capitulations were indeed an instrument of European
domination in China and around the world.175 They were a significant, and
justified, object of grievance.176
But moral equivalence is a trap. Pleas that turnabout is fair play, while
perhaps aesthetically pleasing for the symmetry they invite between past and
169. For a not unsympathetic account of China’s understanding of “harmony” in geopolitics,
but nevertheless expressing the essentials, see Orazio Coco, Contemporary China and the
“Harmonious” World Order in the Age of Globalization, 6(1) CHINESE J. OF GLOBAL GOVERNANCE
1–19 (2020).
170. Id.
171. See Orazio Coco, supra note 168.
172. See id.
173. See Erwin Lowenfeld, The Mixed Courts in Egypt as Part of the System of Capitulations after
the Treaty of Montreux, 26 TRANSACTIONS OF THE GROTIUS SOC’Y 83, 83 (1940) (discussing the
capitulations and mixed courts in the region covered by the Ottoman Empire); see also
Christopher A. Ford, The Asia-Pacific Region’s “Operating System” and the “Chinese Dream” of
Global “Return”
NEW PARADIGMS FORUM
(Apr. 30, 2013), https://
www.newparadigmsforum.com/p1667 [https://perma.cc/4DKX-BFNB].
174. Lowenfeld, supra note 173.
175. Id.
176. Perhaps the most conspicuous procedural incident of that grievance was the Sino-Belgian
case of 1927. See Denunciation of the Treaty of Nov. 2nd, 1865, Between China and Belgium, (Belg.
v. China), Judgment, 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 8 (where the Permanent Court, in provisional
measures that it adopted on Jan. 8, 1927, directed China to continue the capitulatory régime of
the 1865 treaty, at least to the extent, for example, that China was to continue to respect “a
right on the part of any Belgian who may commit a crime against a Chinese or any other
offence against the law, not to be arrested except through a consul, nor to be subjected, as
regards the execution of any penalty involving personal violence or duress, to any except the
regular action of Belgian law”).
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future, do nothing to come to grips with the problem we face today. It is
neither in the interest of democratic-liberal countries nor an obligation on
our part to accept the demands of a single-party state that we change to
accommodate that state’s plans for reordering world affairs. The substantive
merits of the case certainly do not recommend that we change our sociopolitical system to imitate China’s.177 The continuing practice of China of
sending its students, engineers, and scientists to universities and research
institutions in the democratic-liberal countries, and China’s almost frantic
intellectual property theft,178 are not redolent of self-confidence or success.
It is hardly time to abandon the principles that have served democraticliberal societies so well.
The Telekom Deutschland case suggests, at least in a general way, how
democratic-liberal societies might defend our principles.179 China’s
sanctions target private actors with material inducements and deterrents, and
they set an example that other private actors, as things stand today, find
difficult to ignore.180 A counter-sanctions strategy, therefore, will work best
if it addresses private actors and not just China.181 With inducements and
deterrents to the legal profession that present a counterpoise to China’s
spoken and unspoken threats, a counter-sanctions strategy merits serious
consideration by professional leaders, policy makers, and legislators in the
United States, the United Kingdom, and beyond.
When concluding that the EU’s blocking-statute—a particular countersanctions strategy—creates a private cause of action, the Advocate General
of the CJEU in Telekom Deutschland said that the legislature drafted the
statute “in the most uncompromising and stark terms.”182 He characterized
the EU blocking statute as “a very blunt instrument, designed as it is to
sterilise the intrusive extraterritorial effects of . . . sanctions within the
Union.”183 The Advocate General noted, however, that “blunt” though the
blocking statute may be, the EU anti-sanctions law targets one country’s
sanctions only.184 Perhaps the Advocate General was inviting the EU
legislator to think more broadly about whom it addresses its blocking
legislation to.185 If so, then the invitation is timely, even as the December
177. See Ben Rigby, UK and Ireland Bar Associations Team up to Condemn China’s Sanctions on
Essex Court Chambers, THE GLOBAL LEGAL POST (Apr. 27, 2021), https://
www.globallegalpost.com/news/uk-and-ireland-bar-associations-team-up-to-condemnchina39s-sanctions-on-essex-court-chambers-43346750 (criticizing the reputation of the sociopolitical system in China and the consequences of the recently imposed sanctions).
178. See, e.g., Stop China’s IP Theft Act, H.R. 8764, 116th Cong. § 2 (2020).
179. Telekom (Judgment), supra note 12, at ¶¶ 35, 37; Telekom (Advocate General’s Opinion),
supra note 14.
180. See Riordan et al., supra note 141.
181. See Rachel Barnes, et al., The Guide to Sanctions – First Edition, GLOBAL INVESTIGATIONS
REV., (Aug. 14, 2020), at 2.
182. Telekom (Advocate General’s Opinion), supra note 14.
183. Id.
184. Recall that the sanctions that the EU sought to block were U.S. sanctions. See id.
185. See id.
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21, 2021 judgment of the CJEU offers some pathways to temper the
blocking statute’s potentially burdensome effects.186
Whether intended as an invitation or not, Telekom Deutschland teaches a
lesson: if we, as a society, are serious about counteracting the effect of
China’s sanctions, then we have tools for the task. The tools include
compensatory or even injunctive regimes to protect private actors from the
costs of sanctions; and deterrent measures to add costs to steps a private
actor might take to stay in the good books of the sanctioning state. A major
commercial country that threatens private actors in other countries will only
escalate its threats, if those private actors give in.187 But given no
inducement—affirmative or negative—to show resolve, a law firm, a
barrister, or, for that matter, a publicly traded corporation, almost certainly
will not resist.188 Where market share is at stake, and only the sanctioning
country offers inducements, the private actor is most likely to yield to that
country’s wishes.189
None of this is to call for a new regulatory burden before carefully
measuring the benefits and costs. The EU sanctions-blocking legislation
may impose costs on EU businesses; the CJEU judgment of December 21,
2021 recognizes this.190 It remains to be seen how businesses address the
compliance challenges that that legislation seems to present.191 Compliance
will include clear internal records maintenance that shows the reasons for
terminating a relationship with a customer or co-venturer (or for not
starting one).192 Individuals and organizations, including the full range of
professional organizations, should think carefully about their compliance
strategies as the jurisprudence evolves and as legislators consider next steps
as well.193 Aligning one’s conduct with statutory counter-sanctions rules
answers legal and prudential concerns. With well-cast rules that address the
geopolitical concerns that China’s new sanctions present, corporate
compliance also may be put in service to larger social ends.
It would be a mistake if rule-of-law countries restricted themselves to
symbolic gestures when responding to China’s sanctions. When the
Advocate General studied the EU blocking statute, he was troubled by the
consequences for businesses that its strong wording might entail.194 But he
concluded that, “[i]n these circumstances, the threat of ‘dissuasive’
sanctions” not supported by concrete steps “would likely be a hollow one
and the Union and its Member States would be reduced, like Shakespeare’s
186. Id.
187. See Riordan et al., supra note 141.
188. See id.
189. See id.
190. Id.
191. See Thomas D. Grant & F. Scott Kieff, Warnings And Guideposts From EU Sanctions
Blocking Case, LAW360 (June 4, 2021), https://www.law360.com/telecom/articles/1390362/
warnings-and-guideposts-from-eu-sanctions-blocking-case.
192. See id.
193. See id.
194. Telekom (Advocate General’s Opinion), supra note 14.
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King Lear, to protesting that they would ‘do such things . . . I know not
[what], but they shall be the terrors of the earth.’”195 The title character of
the play was enraged over the sanctions his daughters had imposed on him,
but, a spent force, he had no effective way to respond.196 Rule of law is not a
spent force. The countries that embrace it have the ingenuity and means to
address the challenge that China’s sanctions present.

195. Id.
196. See generally WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, KING LEAR act 2, sc. 4.
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